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Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home, the Weather Underground, the Red 
Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). 
In his comparative study of New Left armed struggle in the United States and 
Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, Bringing the War Home, the Weather 
Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionaly Eolence in the Sixties 
and Seventies, Jeremy Varon sets an ambitious agenda for himself. First, he 
seeks to better understand the larger phenomenon of New Left armed struggle 
in advanced capitalist nations; second, he looks to discover what was really par- 
ticular about these movements; third, he seeks to debunk explanations that root 
these armed struggle movements in distinctly American or German terms; final- 
ly, Varon attempts to understand "the origins, purpose and effects of political 
violence" and the broader significance that political violence has for contempo- 
rary social movements (4). In seriously examining the question of the left's 
political violence without apriori judgments on the matter, Varon makes a valu- 
able contribution to New Left historiography. Nevertheless, perhaps because 
his goals are so ambitious, Varon is only partially successful in his efforts. 
Particularly troubling is Varon's inability to place the best known American 
armed struggle group, Weatherman, in its specific historical context. 
Varon is most successful in introducing the Red Army Faction (RAF) and 
the German New Left to a wider audience of American readers and explaining 
how tightly bound the RAF was to recent German history. Growing up as the 
sons and daughters of men and women who had participated or collaborated in 
genocide, and who refused to speak of their Nazi history, German youth desper- 
ately attempted to distinguish themselves from their parents' generation. That 
generation had been silent in the 1930s and the 1940s, and with America's bru- 
tal war against Vietnam, it was silent again. Said one German advocate of 
armed struggle: Germans "should have been the first to start shouting about 
Vietnam. All the Germans, not merely a few leftists. They did nothing. 
Arguing didn't move them, pamphlets didn't convince them, they got used to 
broken windows.. . . So there came a point . . . when something new had to be 
found" (34). Moreover, in taking up arms against the German State by attack- 
ing and killing Germany's political and economic elite, many of whom were 
deeply implicated in the Third Reich, the RAF directly challenged the Nazi 
past. In short, Varon has convincingly shown how Germany's recent history 
shaped the sixties generation of Germans, on both the left and right. 
To be sure, understanding RAF and its relationship to the past in no way 
justifies RAF violence or suggests that it was particularly effective in trans- 
forming German social realities. On the contrary, Varon demonstrates that 
RAF's violence was largely counterproductive: the German State suspended 
civil liberties in order to get at RAF, and the German public largely went along 
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with this, just as it had done in the past. RAF, it seems, was trapped by the past, 
and the violence of its practice may well have flowed from some deep recogni- 
tion and denial of that fact. 
One wishes that Varon had applied his insights on the relation between the 
German New Left and Germany's past to his analysis of Weatherman. If 
Weatherman and the American New Left's young activists did not have the 
Nazi history driving them and shaping their consciousness, they nonetheless 
bore the burden of hundreds of years of white and male supremacy. 
Weatherman activists, strove, by might and main, to overcome their past; but 
their frantic practice, particularly through the latter part of 1969 and into the 
winter of 1970, demonstrated that they too were trapped by their history. In 
place of an analysis rooting Weatherman in American history, and specifically, 
rooting Weatherman activists as young white people, Varon offers a more gen- 
eralized understanding that misses the essence of Weatherman history. 
For example, in his discussion of Weatherman and the anti-war movement, 
Varon hinges a good part of his discussion on the question of violence versus 
non-violence and argues that the totality of antiwar activity constrained the US 
government's hand in its prosecution of the Vietnam War. He suggests, there- 
fore, that the anti-war movement's violence had real impact in slowing the War. 
This is an important point and hardly contestable. When radical activists 
destroyed hundreds of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) buildings, con- 
ducted militant demonstrations against military and military-industrial 
recruiters, fought with police to free seized comrades, and took other forms of 
militant action, they undoubtedly contributed to a growing climate of instabili- 
ty in the United States. As Varon suggests, policymakers did fear this increas- 
ing instability and factored that fear into their calculations of what kinds of 
escalation they could successfully carry out in Vietnam. Thus, Varon implicit- 
ly defends or vindicates a portion of Weatherman's practice. Certainly, Varon's 
position here is an important one in the face of the predominant historiography 
of the era, which condemns anti-war violence out of hand. 
Nevertheless, in evaluating Weatherman's significance to the anti-war 
movement, the question is not one of violence versus non-violence: it is about 
the nature of Weathermank violence. We cannot look at that issue without 
examining a number of related questions: what did Weatherman's use of vio- 
lence mean given its leadership over and destruction of the largest radical anti- 
war organization in the country, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)? 
What did it mean given that Weatherman developed its use of violence not as a 
complement to other forms of struggle, but in opposition to other forms of 
struggle? Or that Weatherman claimed that its violence derived from the 
demands of the Vietnamese or black revolutionaries? In this specific evalua- 
tion of Weatherman's violence, Varon's book falls short. 
Varon largely accepts Weatherman's rationale that its violence flowed from 
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solidarity with Third World revolution. However, nowhere is it more clear that 
Weatherman's violence ran counter to Third World solidarity than in 
Weatherman's relation to the Vietnamese. Although Varon barely touches on 
this matter, it is important to briefly lay that relationship out. Anti-war activists, 
SDSers included, repeatedly met with the Vietnamese during the late-1960s. 
Moreover, the Vietnamese convened a particular meeting with the most radical 
wing of the anti-war movement, Weatherman included, in Havana in July 1969. 
As they had at all previous meetings with US anti-war activists, the Vietnamese 
urged SDSers to make Vietnam an issue again, to raise the slogan of 
"Immediate Withdrawal," and to use Vietnam as a means of exposing the char- 
acter of American society. In other words, the Vietnamese looked to SDS to 
build a broad anti-war movement while simultaneously working to deepen that 
movement's understandings of the nature of the society waging that war. 
Weatherman leader Bernardine D o h ' s  notes from that meeting encapsulated 
the Vietnamese line. Dohrn reported that the head of North Vietnam's delega- 
tion explicitly urged the radicals to "carefully study the situation;" and he also 
warned them against putting "forward a slogan which is too high for people," 
lest the radicals miss the "broadest possibility of unity" (Senate Judiciary 
Internal Security Subcommittee United States, "The Weather Underground," 
[Washington, DC, 19751, 143-6). 
Weatherman returned from that meeting arguing, in the name of solidarity 
with the Vietnamese, the exact opposite of what the Vietnamese had urged on 
them. Thus, when the New Mobilization Committee Against the War asked 
Weatherman to cooperate in building the November 1969 Washington demon- 
stration against the war, Weatherman leader Mark Rudd denounced the 
Immediate Withdrawal slogan as liberal and insisted instead that the demonstra- 
tion organize to "Bring the War Home." After the November demonstration 
was over - it was the largest demonstration in the nation's history - 
Weatherman, which had led contingents trashing windows in Washington, 
ostentatiously declared that "THE WAR ISN'T THE ISSUE ANYMORE - 
the issue was now "violence" (Fire, 21 November 1969). Weatherman thus car- 
ried its Vietcong banners and broke windows in the name of the Vietnamese, 
even as it deliberately ignored their actual message. 
In a similar fashion, Weatherman justified its violence as supporting "black 
leadership." But the most significant black revolutionary organization of the 
day, the Black Panthers, denounced Weatherman for its violence and insisted 
that the white radicals take on a different task: winning the white working class 
to an anti-racist solidarity. So Weatherman's violence, justified in the name of 
supporting black and Third World revolutionary leadership, was not based in 
any real black or Vietnamese leadership. On the contrary, the black and Third 
World leadership that Weatherman followed was a leadership that Weatherman 
itself largely invented. If we want to understand Weatherman's politics, strate- 
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gy and use of violence, and, more importantly, the deeper sense of historical self 
that drove Weatherman, understanding this contradiction would be a good place 
to start. Unfortunately, Bringing the War Home does not make that effort. 
David Barber 
University of Tennessee at Martin 
Julia E. Sweig, Inside the Cuban Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002). 
Inside the Cuban Revolution by Julia E. Sweig, senior fellow and deputy direc- 
tor of the Latin American program at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 
is without a doubt a landmark in the historiography of the Cuban Revolution. 
The book is the first rigorous investigation of the immediate period before the 
revolution. As a staff member of the CFR, Sweig was granted unprecedented 
access to the classified records in the Cuban Council of State's Office of 
Historic Affairs - the only scholar inside or outside of Cuba allowed access to 
the complete collection of Fidel Castro's 26th of July movement's underground 
operatives. 
To have access to first-hand sources - letters, documents written by the 
different actors involved, etc - allowed Sweig to undertake a fearless analysis 
of a crucial stage in Cuban history: the period preceding the taking of power by 
Fidel Castro, which covers the 15 months of the Cuban insurrection (early 1957 
to mid-1958), when the urban underground leadership was the dominant force 
within the 26th of July Movement and Castro did not yet have the political and 
military initiative. 
Using these documents, Sweig argues that in its early days the revolution 
was influenced more by the Cuban middle class and less by Fidel Castro or 
Ernesto 'Che ' Guevara than historians have suggested. She explores the com- 
plex and often contradictory relations between urban members of the 26th of 
July Movement (Llano), and its mountain-based guerrilla in the Sierra Maestra 
(Sierra), effectively shattering one of the enduring myths about the Cuban 
Revolution, forged, in large part, by the official Cuban historiography. Its main 
author was no one less a figure than Guevara, whose account practically sug- 
gests that the Sierra guerrillas single-handedly defeated the Batista regime. 
Sweig, conversely, demonstrates the preponderant function played by the secret 
urban organization of the 26th of July in the triumph of the revolution. Sweig's 
thesis has considerable implications, because it dismantles the myth on which 
Castrist ideology is founded: that the Sierra Maestra fighters, after conducting 
a guerrilla war supported by a rural base, achieved a fm military victory 
